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Abstract
In this paper, the effect of the definition of the tax unit on the
labor force participation of secondary workers is explored. Three
alternative equal yield taxes based on the individual, unit, and
quotient systems are compared according to their effect on tax variables.
It is shown that under reasonable assumptions, an individual tax is more
favorable to the labor force participation of secondary workers than are
the unit and quotient taxes, and that the latter two taxes are equivalent
in their effects on labor force participation.
Individual Taxation vs. Income Splitting:
Implications for Labor Force Participation
In recent years, there has been a strong trend among OECD countries
away from compulsory or family taxation and towards individual taxation.
As of 1977, individual taxation was allowed in seventeen OECD countries
and was compulsory in thirteen. This change in tax practice has been
accompanied by a growing literature, both pro and con, on the relative
merits in temr^s of equity and efficiency of family and individual taxa-
2
tion. The purpose of this paper is to explore an important aspect of
the efficiency question: what effect has the choice of the unit of
taxation upon the labor force participation of secondary workers within
the family?
I. Taxation and the Participation Decision
There are three predominant approaches, to the taxation of families.
One, individual taxation, ignores family relationships and taxes its
members as separate individuals, A second, unit ta>:ation, treats the
family as a unit and aggregates the incomes cf its members, applying a
single rate schedule to aggregate family income. The third, quotient
taxation, divides total family income into a number of parts depending
on the number of persons in the family (and sometimies on their composi-
tion) . A single rate schedule is then applied and the resulting tax
liability is multiplied by the number of parts.
Among the most recent countries tc adept individual taxation are
Denmark (1970), Sv/eden (1971), and Austria (1973), Several countries
require individual taxation if family income is less than a certain fig-
ure (350,000 BF in Belgium and 5 million lire in Italy), while Canada
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taxes husbands and wives separately when the wife earns more than
$1,806.
Unit taxation is based on the dependency principle. In Great
Britain, the wife's income is treated as if it were the husband's, and
3
in recognition of this burden, he receives a special allowance. Recent
modifications of this system allow the wife a personal allowance against
her own income and a couple can opt for separate taxation of their earn-
ings, although they lose the married man's additional allowance if they
do so
.
The quotient system, as applied in France, allows two parts for
married couples, and one-half part for each of their dependent children.
A married couple with two children would be allocated three parts, and
their tax payment would equal three times that of a single person V7ith
one- third their family income. In the United States, a modified quo-
tient system is employed. Married couples receive two parts with no
additional parts for dependent children. A married couple pays twice
the tax of a single person with half their income. Hence, the term
4
"income splitting" has become associated with the U.S. income tax.
For a family with N members, the three types of taxation can be ex-
pressed symbolically as:
Individual
;
N
T = E T (Y.)
i=l
Unit:
^U = \^^V1=1
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Quotient:
N
v.iiere T is the tax function, Y. is the income of family member i, and
q = q(N) is the quotient which depends in some way on the number of fam-
ily members, K,
The choice of the unit of taxation is important to the labor force
participation decision because the definition of the tax unit affects
the reservation wage, the minimum wage necessary to induce participa-
tion. In the absence of taxation, workers who are free to work as they
\v-ish will choose to enter the labor market and supply positive hours of
work if their actual wage is greater than their reservation v^age. If
their actual wage is less than their reservation wage, the worker vd.ll
choose not to participate in the labor force; and if the actual wage is
just equal to the reservation wage, the worker participates but offers
zero hours of work.
Income taxes act to change the reservation wage and, hence, affect
the labor force participation decision. On the one hand, increases in the
marginal rate of tax tend to increase the reservation wage and discour-
age labor force participation. And on the other, income taxes act to
reduce disposable non-work income, reducing the reservation wage, and
encouraging labor force participation. Since these effects are oppos-
ing, it is impossible, without adding more structure to the model, to
predict whether a change in taxes will encourage or discourage labor
force participation.
-4-
In V7hat follows, we first develop a labor force participation model
\-rLth a personal income tax based en the linear expenditure system. The
model allows us to see clearly the opposing effects of taxation on labor
force participation. We then consider three equal yield hypothetical
income taxes based on the individual, tmit, and quotient system and
assess which is most favorable and which least favorable to labor force
participation.
II. A Model of Labor Force Participation with Taxes
In our model, we consider the primary worker's hours as given in-
stitutionally and consider the labor force participation decision of the
secondary worker. Although married women are often secondary workers,
free to work or not as they choose, the model applies equally to married
men. Indeed, some families may not have any secondary workers and, for
them, this model would not be applicable.
Assume that the welfare of a representative family is defined by
the following utility function
U = elog(Y^ + W2N2 - T - Y^) + (1 - B)log(M - N2 - Y2)
where 6 is a constant between zero and one, the y's are minimum required
income and leisure, Y^ is the income of the primary worker, W„ is the
gross wage rate of the secondary worker, N^ is the number of hours
worked by the secondary worker, T is the tax function, and M is the timie
endowment. The income of the primary worker is assumed to include the
prcperty income cf the family and tc be filled and exogenous to the labor
supply decision of the secondary worker. The tax function.
T = T(J^_,V^tl^-)
-5-
3T
is assumed progressive, with positive first derivatives T^ = -rrr- and
1 3Y
T = 9T
Maximization of U with respect to N^ yields the following labor
supply function for the secondary worker:
^ B(1-T2)(M-Y2) (l-BXY^-T+Yj^)
N. =
2 (1-6TJ W„(l-eT^)
where the asterisk emphasizes that the nonnegativity restriction has not
*
been accounted for. The reservation wage, W„, is computed by setting
N- = and solving. This gives:
*
_
(l-g) . (Yj^-T-Y^)
^ (i-t^cm-yP
where the hats indicate that the variable is evaluated at N^ = 0. Hence,
labor force participation is given by:
LFP = 1 if W >_ W*
LFP = if W^ <_ W^
Note first the non-tax determinants of the reservation wage. The
(1—6)
factor reflects the weight the family places on leisure relative
to income. The larger this factor, the more weight given to leisure,
the greater the reservation wage, and the less likely is labor force
participation of the secondarj^ worker. Further, the income of the primary
worker, Y
, and "required" leisure, Yoj also both vary positively \vith
the reservation v<agc, and hence increases in either vould be expected to
reduce labor force participation of the secondary worker. Finally, the
higher the "required" income of the family, y^, the lower the reservation
wage, and the more likely is participation.
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Turning now to the tax determinants of the reservation wage, we see
that taxation affects the reservation wage through two terms, T, the tax
on the primary worker's income, and T^, the marginal tax rate on the
first dollar earned by the secondary worker. Increases in the tax on
the primary worker reduce the reservation wage and increase the prob-
ability of participation by the secondary xcorker. Increases in the
marginal tax rate on the secondary Tv^orker's first dollar of earnings
increase the reservation wage and reduce the probability of partici-
pation by the secondary Xvjorker. Only for tax changes which have opposing
effects on T and T2 can we say what will happen to labor force participa-
tion. We will show in the remainder of the paper that an individual tax
is more favorable to the labor force participation of secondary workers
than either a unit or a quotient tax of equal yield, and that under cer-
tain conditions, equal yield unit and quotient taxes affect participation
equally.
III. A Comparison of Equal Yield Family and Individual Taxes
In order to compare equal yield taxes, we need to m^ke an assumption
about the form of the tax function. We assume that the tazi system is
such that the marginal rate of tax is a constant fraction of income:
^- fiY
Since the tax is progressive, must be positive.
Given this assumption, the form of the tax function for individual,
unit, and quotient tc'x;ation is:
Individual:
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^I - 2 ^ 2
Unit
:
^U " % 2
Quotient:
V^2
^
^Q = ^Q
-T-
g
where it is assumed that the quotient equals two parts for all families.
It then follows that in order to equalize revenues from the three taxes,
it must be that
^\h^2h ""'
^
e = e^, = e^ i +—^ -y- - 2 ®q
h h
where the summation, h, is over all households in the economy. Since the
term in parentheses ranges between one and two,
^
Z,
r^ F r^ F rj, ^ 2r
where equality holds only if all families have only one earner or if
Y,^ = \' ^ for all h.ih Zh
First consider the implications of these assumptions for T, the tax
on the primary worker. Setting Y^, the income of the secondary worker
equal to zero, yields for the three fonr.s of taxation:
Individual
:
e Y^
; = -LI
-1 1
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Unit:
^U 2 ~ 2
Quotient: ~~
._
^Q " 4 2
and it follows that since 9-r ^ 6j
A A 4^
The tax on the primary worker is highest under individual taxation, and
identical under unit and quotient taxation when the taxes are equal yield,
A
Next consider the inplications for T™, the marginal tax rate on the
first dollar earned by the secondary worker. For the three forms of
taxation this gives:
Individual:
T^., =
Unit
:
^U2 = \^^1 = '\
Quotient:
Y
^C2 " \1 ~ ^^1
ind it fellows that
•12 U2 ^Q2
-9-
The marginal tax rate on the first dollar earned by the secondary irorker
is least under individual taxation, and equal under unit and quotient
taxation,
What does this imply for the labor force participation of secondary
workers? Since individual taxation results in a higher tax on the pri-
mary worker and a lower marginal tax rate on the first dollar earned by
the secondary worker, the reservation wage will be lower and labor force
participation higher under individual taxation than under unit or quo-
tient taxation. Further, since equal yield unit and quotient taxes af-
fect the tax on the primary worker and the marginal tax rate equally,
9
they have equivalent effects on labor force participation.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that under certain assumptions, an
individual income ta:c is more favorable to the labor force participation
of secondary^ workers than either an equal yield unit tax or an equal
yield quotient tax. Also, equal yield unit and quotient taxes are likely
to have equivalent effects on participation. These conclusions are
important in light of the trend toward adoption of individual taxation
among European countries, and in view of several recoirmendations for
reform of the U.S. income tax.
Among those supporting individual taxation in the U.S. are Rosen
(1977), Munnell (1980), and Brazer (198C) , vihile Pechman (1977) supports
a form of unit taxation. Under the Pechman proposal, families would
still be treated as the unit of taxation but income splitting would be
eliminated. The same rate schedule would be used for individuals and
married couples. In order to reduce the work disincentives associated
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with this type of tax, Pechman proposes a special deduction or credit
based on the earnings of the lesser-earning spouse,
Ivliile this paper has focused solely on the effect of the definition
of the tax unit on the labor force participation of secondary workers,
choice of the appropriate unit of taxation rests on other factors as
well. The definition of the tax unit affects the ntmber of hours worked
by secondary workers as was shown by Rosen (1976), Other efficiency
effects—on marriage, divorce, cohabitation, and fertility, for example-
require further study.
The results of this paper rest on several assumptions: exogenous
labor supply of primary workers, linear expenditure system, and a tax
linear in the marginal tax rate. Further research is being directed
toward analyzing the consequences of their relaxation.
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Footnotes
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1977),
p. 15.
2
See especially Mxinnell (1980) , Brazer (1980) , Mclntyre (1980)
,
Mclntyre and Oldman (1979) , and Rosen (1977)
.
^Kay and King (1978), p. 211.
4
Since 1969 when a reduction was made in the rate schedule for
single persons, the U.S. income ta:c has not been an example of true in-
come splitting.
In technical terms, the reservation wage is defined as the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between income and leisure at zero hours of
work.
The model extends the model of Deaton and Kuellbauer (1980),
pp. 274-275, by adding an income tax.
The presence of children in the home is likely to increase both
y's and, hence, have opposing effects on participation.
o
These functions were derived by integrating the marginal tax rate
function.
9
This result depends on the assumption that the quotient is
identically equal to two for all families. UTiere this assumption is
violated, equivalence of unit and quotient taxation is no longer exact.
\-12-
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